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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~TATE OF UTAH, 
Plaiutiff and Rrsj){)Jiderzt, 
-YS.-
CHARLES LEE :MITCHELL, 





Defendant was charged with the murder of Fred 
Martin in Cache County, li tah, and was found guilty 
of second degree murder after a one week trial com-
mencing ~larch 1 :>, 19;14-. The trial court imposed sen-
tence. From that judgment defendant takes this appeal. 
Respondent feels that the statement of facts of 
defendant's brief is not adequate. Defendant makes no 
attempt to supply a summary of the proof. Such a sum-
mary is stated here, the attempt being to set down a 
chronological narrative. In view of the verdict, the 
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record is reviewed in a light favorahll' to respondent. 
This brief adopts the page designation employed by 
defendant: pages in the court reporter's transcript are 
referred to as "B ______ "; pages in the record as "R ______ ". 
Charles Lee :Mitchell, the defendant and appellant, is 
referred to throughout as ''defendant.'' 
Fred :Martin's body was found in North Logan, 
Cache County, on the morning of Oct. 28, 1953, at the 
side of a little-used country lane (B. 22). Defendant 
was arrested on a Greyhound bus at Bozeman, }\fontana, 
on Oct. 30th, in connection with the crime. (B. 210). 
Defendant and .Martin worked in the potato fields 
near Blackfoot, Idaho (B. 453-4). Defendant owned, 
prior to the crime, a .25 calibre Star automatic pistol. 
He pawned this gun on Oct. 7, 1953 at Sam's Loan Com-
pany in Pocatello, and redeemed it from pledge on Oct. 
22nd, receiving it back (B. 238-9). On Oct. 26th, at 2:30 
a.m., defendant participated in an altercation growing 
out of a dice game in an upstairs room of the ~ ew Tourist 
Hotel in Blackfoot (B. 262, 459). The hotel-keeper was 
aroused by sounds of running, and a beer bottle hitting 
the bottom of the stairs (B. 262). He then heard a shot, 
opened his door, and saw defendant standing on the 
stairs with his automatic in his hand (B. 262). In 
cleaning up the following morning, the hotel-keeper found 
a spent .25 calibre cartridge case on the stairs (B. 264). 
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found imbedded in the carpeting of the stairs (B. 285). 
This slug, and the cartridge case, figure importantly in 
the subsequent testimony. 
Defendant and 1\iartin drove to Ogden for a holiday, 
arriving on the morning of Oct. 27th (B. 93). They 
spent the day there, seeing several of defendant's ac-
quaintances, among them Charles Williams (B. 93), 
Herman Smith (B. 304), and _Mr. and 1\'Irs. DeWitt rray-
lor (B. 146, 167). Fred Martin, nicknamed "Pops", was 
identified as being his companion that day (B. 94-5, 149, 
170, 308). Defendant admitted the trip to Ogden, with 
Martin (B. 489). l\Iartin had a sum of money: on Oct. 
22nd, he offered his employer a loan with which to meet 
the 60-75 man payroll (B. 274); Charles Williams saw 
the bank roll in Ogden and described it as "quite a wad" 
(B. 95) ; and Pops was described by defendant as 
"loaded" (B. 94) and as "sticking" (i.e., had money) 
(B. 108). Defendant, Charles Williams, and Herman 
Smith discussed Pop's bank roll and tried to devise a 
scheme to get it from him (B. 94, 108). 
Defendant had his .25 calibre automatic ·with him 
in Ogden (B. 98, 128, 150). Various descriptions of it 
make it clear that it ·was the same gun which he pawned, 
and which he used in the earlier shooting scrape in 
Blackfoot. De Witt r:raylor described it as ''a little .25 
automatic''; ''a little small gun with a thumb cock on 
the hammer'' (B. 150). Mrs. Taylor called it ''a little 
black gun with a little thing on the back side, looked like 
a trigger to me" (B. 168). A comparison 'vith the 
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pawnbroker ·s description shows it to be the 8ame gun 
(" ... it's about four or four and a half inches overall 
length. It's an open hammer gun. You '11 find a lot of 
automatics are hammerless. This is an open hammer.'') 
(B. 238). 
There is evidence that late in the evening Pops be-
came drunk (B. 316), and there was some difficulty be-
tween him and defendant about the car keys (B. 97). 
Defendant stated, about the keys, '' ... that wm; his 
business, it was his keys. I mean, he brought the old 
man down and he'd take him back when he got ready 
to go" (B. 97-8). At about 9 p.m., defendant, Pops, and 
other friends were at De Witt Taylor's house at a party 
(B. 98, 152). Defendant was heard hy DeWitt Taylor 
to say, "We're going to leave sometime tonight. Going 
back to Pocatello." (B. 153). ~irs. Taylor also heard 
defendant say that" ... they were pulling out that night." 
(B. 174). ~irs. Taylor thought that all the visitors at 
the house left together (B. 171). :Mrs. Taylor was also 
told by defendant that he had a $150 interest in ~1:artin's 
Plymouth coupe "·hich they drove to Ogden (B. 170}. 
Defendant and :~\lartin were seen together about 9:45 
p.m. that night at a tavern by Herman Smith, whom de-
fendant invited to go to Idaho with them (B. 307, 318); 
Smith agreed to go, but was dissuaded hy other friends 
(B. 307, 318). 
The dead body of Fred Martin was found next 
morning on a side road in North Logan, Utah (B. 22). 
Death was caused by a bullet which entered the right 
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side of Martin's neck and proceeded upwards, into the 
brain (B. 34-5). Death was instantaneous (B. 42). The 
examining doctor found also that Martin's skull had been 
fractured by a blow with a blunt instrument (B. 38). The 
skull fracture was aceompanied by hematoma, or a blood 
clot, indicating that :Martin was struck on the head before 
he was shot, since a hematoma does not form after 
death (B. 39). rrhe doctor first examined the body at 
11:40 a.m. on Oct. 27th, and was of the opinion, based 
upon the progress of rigor mortis, that death occurred 
about twelYe hours prior, with two hours lee\\'ay either 
way (B. 33). 
The black Plymouth coupe, 1941 model, bearing 
Washington license plates, in which defendant and Pops 
drove to Ogden, was found abandoned in Blackfoot the 
same morning, Oct. 28th (B. 176), and was examined by 
law enforcement officers the next day (B. 184). A spent 
.2:J calibre cartridge case was found on the floor of the 
car (B. 185). A piece of the car's seat cover, blood 
stained, was cut out and sent to the F.B.I. laboratory 
for analysis (B. 187-189). Witnesses Charles "\Villiams 
and De Witt Taylor identified the car as being the one 
which defendant and Martin had in Ogden (B. 99-100, 
148). 
Defendant also was in Blackfoot the early morning 
of Oct. 28th. Before 7 a.m. the night clerk at the Grand 
Hotel saw him come out of Room 7, and he paid her the 
money for the following night's rent (B. 193). He ap-
parently changed his mind, however, and left Blackfoot 
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that day, despite the fact that his employer there in 
Blackfoot owed him some money, tlw lath'r e\'idelll'l' 
ha,·ing been admitted as tending to proYe flight (B. :n:n. 
Defendant was seen in Idaho Falls on October 28th at 5 
p.m. (B. 323). He there asked a friend to buy him some 
gin, and in getting out the money he inadvertently ex-
hibited some cartridges larger in size than .22s but 
smaller than .45s (B. 323-4). Defendant at that time 
also had a bus ticket to Butte, Montana (B. 324). 
Defendant was picked up at 1:35 a.m. on October 
30th at Bozeman, Montana (B. 209). In his suitcase were 
five cartridges for a .25 calibre automatic (B. 218). 
rrhe record establishes that the murder weapon was 
the .25 calibre Star automatic which defendant redeemed 
from pawn on Oct. 22nd, which he employed in the shoot-
ing scrape in Blackfoot on Oct. 25th, and which he had 
in Ogden on the 27th. Microscopic ballistic tests proved 
that the bullet slug taken from _Martin's brain (Exh. 6) 
was fired by defendant's gun, the same gun that fired 
the bullet slug in the Blackfoot hotel (B. 297). Micro-
scopic examination of the shell casing found in the aban-
doned car proved that it bore the marks of defendant's 
gun, the same gun that fired the shot in the Blackfoot 
hotel (B. 297). The shell casings inYolved in the murder, 
the hotel incident, and those found in defendant's suit-
case, are products of the same manufacturer-Reming-
ton, and are all .25 calibre automatic bullets (B. 298-9). 
The blood splotch on the seat cover of 1\iartin 's car was 
human blood, of Group B (B. 290). The blood on l\iar-
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tin's trousers and tee shirt was also human blood, Group 
B (B. 291). Human bloodstains were found on a shirt 
and trousers taken from defendant's suitcase, and inside 
the right hand pocket of another pair of defendant's 
trousers, but the stains were too small to enable the 
F.B.I. technician to make grouping tests (B. 291). 
At the place .Martin's body was found, prints of 
automobile tires showed ·where a car had pulled to the 
edge of the road (B. 7:2). One of the feet of the dead 
body lay out on the edge of the shoulder of the road, 
and the rear tire of the automobile had passed over 
the foot (B. 72). Plaster-of-paris casts were made of 
the tire prints (B. 73) which were receivetl as Exhibits 
10, 11, and 12 (B. 87). The officer who made the casts 
was of the opinion that the tire marks matched the front 
and rear tires on the right hand side of Martin's car 
(B. 350-2). The clerk of this court has both the tires 
and the casts, and the court, on examination, will be 
able to match the casts with the appropriate tires. 
The defendant's testimony is outlined briefly. He 
admitted that he and l\Iartin spent the day in Ogden, 
but says he gave Pops the car keys about 9 p.m. and 
never saw him again (B. 504). Defendant claims he 
stayed in Ogden with Herman Smith and others, leaving 
them about 1 a.m. (B. 505). He then caught a freight 
train to Pocatello (B. 507). He expressly denied DevVitt 
Taylor's testimony about his automatic (B. 501); denied 
Charles William's testimony about a scheme to get Pop's 
bankroll, and about Williams having seen the gun (B. 
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502); denied Herman Smith'~ testimony of having seen 
the clip for the automatic, and of defendant's invitation 
to leave Ogden with him and Pops (B. 506). 
Defendant says he arrived at Pocatello about i-8 
a.m. (B. 508) and hitched a ride to Blackfoot, arriving 
9-10 a.m. (B. 509). He bought a bus ticket to Butte 
(B. 510), then got n ticket to Denver (B. 517). He 
denied the h'stimony of the Hight clerk of the Grand 
Hotel in Blackfoot, Esther Scott, as to his having been 
there before 7 a.m. (B. 511). l-Ie <lenied Earl \Villiam's 
testimony that he had bullets in his pocket at 5 p.m. in 
Idaho Falls (B. 512). The blood on his clothes, he says, 
resulted from a cut on his hand about Oct. 1st (B. 526). 
He admitted that the blood-stained trousers (Exh. 39) 
'vere worn on the Ogden excursion, and also that a blue 
shirt--presumably Exh. :~2-was worn to Ogden (B. 543). 
Defendant's version of the hotel shooting fracas 
was that he did not fire a gun, that the only gun he held 
was a .32 six-shooter which he knocked out of a .Mexi-
can's hand (B. 541). He explained possession of the 
.25 calibre bullets by saying he had had them ever since 
1949, when he owned a gun of that calibre (B. 524). 
Defendant testified he got the .25 calibre Star auto-
matic from Pancho, a :Mexican, who pawned it to de-
fendant for a loan in connection with a crap game. 
Defendant pawned it to Sam's Loan Company, redeemed 
it, then returned it to Pancho and never saw it again 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(B. 489). On rebuttal, Herman Smith stated he saw 
defendant with a .2S calibre automatic of the same 
general appearance in September, in Boise and Pocatello 
(B. 668-9). Audrey Baird, employed in a Boise pawn 
shop, identified Exhibits 62 and 63, indicating that de-
fendant had also pawned a .23 calibre Star automatic 
in September, and redeemed it Oct. 3rd (B. 680-7). De-
fendant thereupon resumed the stand and admitted this 
other pawnshop transaction (B. 693), and explained that 
he got the same gun from the same :Mexican in another 
gambling transaction, while they were in Caldwell, Ida., 
topping onions (B. 694). 
Several defense 'Witnesses corroborated defendant's 
testimony that he was in Ogden between 9 p.m. and 1:00 
a.m. on Oct. 27th. 
Defendant's story about having jumped aboard a 
refrigerator car on the train (B. 580), 'vas rebutted 
with proof that the particular train, #3816, was without 
any refrigerator car (B. 647). Defendant's claim that 
he jumped the train at the point the tracks divide (Cecil 
Junction) near the ·watchman's shanty by the jungle 
(B. 575-6), was rebutted with proof that #3816 went out 
the main passenger line, some two blocks away (B. 638). 
ST A'rE1\fENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE CO:\IPL~\1~'11 \YAS LAWFUL. 
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VE~TTE WAS CORRECTLY LAID IN CACHE 
COUNTY. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADl\11'1,-
rriNG EXHIBITS 2, 8, AND 9. 
POINT IV. 
ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE OF rrHE 
WITNESS CLAUDE HOLI\IES WAS CORRECT IN 
THAT (A) THE RULE EXCLUDING PROOF OF 
ANOTHER OFFENSE IS NOT INVOLVED; (B) 
PROOF OF MOTIVE IS ADl\IISSIBLE; (C) VIOLA-
TION OF THE EXCLUSION RULE WAS NOT A 
BAR TO HIS TESTIMONY. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO IN-
STRUCT ON ALL INCLUDED OFFENSES WAS 
CORRECT. 
POINT VI. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS rrHE VERDICT. 
10 
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ARGli~IEN"T 
POINT I. 
THE <j<>MPLAINT \VAS LAWFUL. 
Defendant's first point is directed at the complaint 
filed before the Logan City Judge, Jesse P. Rich. The 
document appears in the record at R. 2. Defendant's 
argument is that it was approved by the District At-
torney rather than the County Attorney, and is there-
fore void. rrhe proposition is apparently based on Sec. 
77-12-1, U.C.A. 1953, which defendant cites. rrhe sec-
tion reads: 
When a verified complaint is made before a 
magistrate charging the commission of a crime 
or public offense, he must, if satisfied therefrom 
that the offense complained of has been com-
mittec1 and that there is reasonable ground to 
believe that the accused committed it, issue a war-
rant for his arrest; but \vhen the magistrate 
before whom the complaint is made is a justice 
of the peace, before issuing the warrant, the 
complaint, if made l>y any person other than the 
county attorney of the count~', and the evidence 
taken hy such magistrate relating to the offense 
charged, must be suhmitted to such county attor-
ney, and he must examine into the charge and 
enter either his approval or disapproval of the 
issuance of a warrant upon such complaint. If 
the ('onnt~, attontey disapproves, no warrant shall 
be issued, but if he approves the issuance of a 
warrant, such magistrate shall proceed accord-
ingly; provided, that when it appears from the 
complaint or evidence submitted to the magistrate 
that the accused is likely to escape from the county 
before such approval of the count!' attonH'Y can 
be had, a \\'arrant may issue without the approval 
11 
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of the county attorney. X o justice of the peace 
shall receive any fees or allowanees whatever for 
any act done or services rendered in a criminal 
action or proreeding commenced or prosecuted in 
disregard of the provisions of this section. 
The section does not apply to this case. "\Vhat the 
statute says is that where a complaint is heard by a 
justice of the peace, the County Attorney must also 
approve before an arrest is ordered. The reason for 
the 8tatute is that justices of the peace are not required 
by law to be lawyers, as are all other magistrates (Su-
preme Court Justices, by Art. VIII, ~ 2, Utah Const.; 
District Judges, by _Art. VIII, § 3, Utah Const.; City 
Judges, by Sec. 78-4-8, U.C.A. 1953). The legislature 
apparently thought it appropriate that an additional 
check be placed upon the exerrise of the power of a 
magistrate by a justice of the peace. 
The complaint here involved was sworn to before 
the City Judge of Logan; it was not made before a 
justice of the peace. This means that neither the District 
Attorney nor the County Attorney need have approved 
the complaint. This is the view taken by the trial judge 
(B. 358), and it seems clearly rorrect. 
Respondent contends further that the District At-
torney has power to sign in the County Attorney's stead, 
if the latter is not available. Such authorization is con-
tained in Sec. 67-7-4, U.C.A. 1953, which reads: 
The district attorney shall, when it does not 
conflict with other official duties, attend to all 
legal business required of him in his district by 
1~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the attorney general, without charge, when the 
interests of the state are involved. All the duties 
and powers of public prosecutor shall be assumed 
and disrharged by the district attorney, except in 
cases of prosecutions for misdemeanors, and pre-
liminary examinations before justices of the peace, 
but the district attorney may, whenever he deems 
it necessar.\', appear and prosecute for misde-
meanors, and in preliminary examinations before 
justire~ of the peace and other magistrates. 
Further, the statute at issue is a part of Ch. 12, of Title 
77, which chapter deals with the warrant of arrest and 
not at all with what is required for a valid complaint. 
Defendant has not referred to Ch. 11, the chapter in 
the Code of Criminal Procedure dealing with complaints. 
The question raised simply goes to the propriety of the 
warrant. The validity of the complaint, and jurisdiction 
of the defendant and the cause, are unaffected. 
Xeither 1'-J'tate c. Oreenc, 78 lT. 380, 6 P. ~d 177, nor 
State r. Jlorse, ~7 U. 336, 73 P. 739, cited by defendant, 
reaches the proposition ·which defendant urges, and 
neither case contains even a comment about it one way 
or another. 1'-,'tate r. J.ll arrey, 23 U. 273, 64 P. 764; State 
r. Beddo, 22 U. 432, 63 P. 96, and State r. Blfkcr, 23 U. 
276, 64 P. 1118, are not in point. Those cases each in-
volved a prosecution commenced by an information filed 
by the district attorney pursuant to a statutory procedure 
later held to be uHconstitutional. 
Fullingin v. State (Okla. 1912), 123 P. 558, 1s an 
Oklahoma bootlegging case cited and quoted by defend-
ants. There the rounty attorney had signed, in blank, a 
13 
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number of informations. A clerk would fill thL'Sl' in, tlw11 
issue a warrant of arrest, without the knowledge of the 
county judge or the county attorney. Such a proredure 
was of course held improper. The casP is not remotely 
like the case at bar, however. 
POINT II. 
VENUE \VAS CORRECrrLY LAID IN CA(a-IE 
COUNTY. 
Defendant's second point charges error in that there 
was failure to prove venue. The claim is that there was 
no evidence that the fatal shot was fired in Cache 
County. 
At the outset, respondent disagrees with defendant's 
statement of the relevant law. In some states, the rule 
is that venue must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
People v. Gregor, 359 Ill. 402, 194 N.E. 550; State v . 
.Ll!iller, 133 Ore. 256, 289 P. 1063; Bridges r. State, 72 Ga. 
App. 390, 33 S.E. 2d 850; State v. 1Vicrlcnfeld, 229 Wis. 
563, 282 N.W. 621; 1Vlayes v. State, 22 Ala. App. 316, 115 
S. 291; State v. Schroyer, 66 Ohio App. 30, 31 N.E. 2d 
469. 
On the other hand, a mere preponderance of evidenre 
has been held sufficient to establish Yenue in Stribling 
v. State, 171 Ark. 184, 284 S.\V. 38; Skipper r. State, 114 
Fla. 312, 153 S. 853; People v. Vinceuc,io, 71 Cal. App. 
2d, 361, 162 P. 2d 650; Dar is v. State, 75 Okla. Cr. 220, 
130 P. 2d 111; Barragau l'. State, 141 Tex. Cr. 12, 147 
J4 
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S.W. 2d 234; Stillson v. State, 181 Tenn. 172, 180 S.W. 
2d 883, and State ~·. Kinka.id, 69 Wash. 273, 124 P. 684. 
In Kentucky, ''slight'' proof is enough. Commonwealth 
r. Ducal!, 220 Ky. 771, 295 S.W. 1047; Gee c. Common-
tcealth, 263 l{y. 808, 94 S.W. 2d 17. 
The better reasoned cases adopt the view that venue 
1s not an element of a crime in the same sense that 
malice, for example, is an element of a murder, and 
therefore hold that venue need not be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt. A California court in People v. 
Harkness (1942), 124 P. 2d 85, has this to say on the 
subject (124 P. 2d, at 88): 
As was said by this court in People v. Carter, 
10 Cal. App. 2d 387, 52 P. 2d 294, 295, "The state 
gives no assurance to its feloniously insubordinate 
citizens that the venue of their crimes will be fixed 
beyond a reasonable doubt; that doctrine applies 
only to the issue of guilt. People v. :McGill, [10 
Cal. App. 2d 155, at page 159], 51 P. 2d 433; 
Underhill on Criminal Evidence, vol. I, § 36, p. 45. 
The defendant and appellant, therefore, is in no 
position to complain because the location of the 
offense was not established to a degree of cer-
tainty more to his liking." 
In all the states, regardless of the required quantum of 
proof, circumstantial evidence of \'enue is sufficient, and 
direct evidence is not required. This is the Utah rule. 
,'-,'fate c. Grceuc, 38 U. 389, 113 P. 181. 
This court dealt with a venue problem in State v. 
Greene, 38 U. 389, 115 P. 181, which was an adultery 
prosecution tried in Sanpete County. rrhere was no 
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direct proof of venue. The court held, however, that 
venue could be inferred from this evidence: defendant 
and the girl lived in Mt. Pleasant, in the same house 
with defendant's wife; the parties had not left the county 
during the critical period except for brief visits. The 
girl left for California where a baby was born. There 
she made affidavit that defendant was the father, and 
that sexual intercourse had taken place in l\1t. Pleasant. 
On being shown the affidavit defendant said, "I don't 
believe the baby is mine." This court construed tlu~t 
statement as being an admission of the intercourse, at 
Mt. Pleasant, and hence an admission of venue. It should 
be noted that the girl's affidavit was hearsay, and was 
admitted only for the limited purpose of forming a basis 
for defendant's admission. The substance of the affi-
davit was not considered as to the venue problem. 
In State v. Marasco, 81 U. 325, 17 P. 2d 919, venue 
was established on slighter evidence. The charge was 
arson. The proof was that the building was: "located 
in the outskirts of Helper, not in the main business part 
of town''; that the defendant's place of business was 
"the west side of Helper, Bryner subdivision." The 
finding of venue ·was affirmed. This court reasoned that 
judicial knowledge placed Helper in Carbon County-
this despite the fact that_ the jury were not so instructed. 
See also State v. Campbell (Utah, 1949), 208 P. 2d 
530. 
Based upon the foregoing authorities, it i~ sub-
mitted that the rules controlling the ,·enue of criminal 
16 
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trials in Utah are: (1) that venue may be established 
by a preponderance of evidence, and need not be shown 
beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) that venue may be 
inferred from circumstantial evidence and need not be 
shown by direct proof. 
It should be noted that there is present here a jury 
finding of venue. A reading of the transcript indicates 
that defendant ~s counsel made this issue sharply clear 
to the jury. Defendant was found guilty under Instruc-
tion Twelve (R. 109) which defined second degree 
murder. The trial court by this instruction, and by In-
struction Seventeen, imposed upon the prosecutor the 
burden of proving venue beyond a reasonable doubt, 
which in respondent's view was more than what the law 
requires. The only remaining question is whether the 
finding is within the bounds of reasonable inference. 
Defendant makes much of Dr. Daines' theory that 
~Iartin was killed at a place other than where he was 
found (B. 41, 45). The doctor's evidence indicates that 
his idea was based upon the absence of blood on the 
ground. He testified (B. 45, line 8) : 
Q .. .:\nd what led you to believe that [:Martin 
was killed elsewhere] ? 
"\. Because there -,vas no blood on the ground, 
and the wound he received, there \vould have had 
to be considerable hleeding. 
Q. You dic1 not observe any hlood on the 
ground! 
A. No blood on the ground whatever. 
17 
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The significance of this passage is that it shows that 
the basis of his conjecture \Yas an observable php•ieal 
fact-the presence or absence of blood. The validity of 
the doctor's conjecture depends upon the validity of his 
factual observation. 
The preponderance of evidence (as the jury en-
dently believed) is that there was blood on the ground. 
Deputy Rowley said that when the body was moved therr 
was blood on the ground, under Martin's head and chest 
(B. 60). Deputy Sorenson observed a 4 to 5 inch spot 
of blood on the leaves and dirt directly under the wound 
(B. 72). Deputy Rowley also testified that he dug some 
soil from underneath 1fartin's body which had blood 
on it (B. 345). This witness stuck by his story despite 
defense counsel's attempt to get him to say that it may 
have been red paint, or rabbit's blood (B. 346). The 
soil was received as Exh. 41. 
It is to be noted that these witnesses had a better 
opportunity to examine the premises than did Dr. Daines, 
whose function was simply to examine the body. The 
law is clear that a lay witness can distinguish, and testify 
about, blood stains. 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 887. 
Taken altogether, the evidence supports a finding 
that the killing occurred in Cache County. That was 
where the body was found, and the jury could well have 
considered the natural inclination of one who has killed 
a man, and who has custody of the victim's car, "-ith the 
victim in it, to get rid of the body quickly. The poor 
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concealment of the body, and the running over its foot 
with the car, indicate that it was gotten rid of with some 
haste. rrhe body was not carried for any great distance 
after death because it was still bleeding when it was 
thrown where it was found. Death occurred instantane-
ously. This is sufficient evidence for a valid jury finding 
of venue. 
Marion u. State (Neb., 1886), 29 N.W. 911, holds that 
the place where a body is found is a factor from which 
may be inferred the locality of the homicide. There, the 
defendant and deceased left Kansas "·ith a team and 
wagon, which belonged to deceased but which defendant 
was buying from him. Defendant had bought and re-
paired a pistol to take on the trip. rrhey were seen in 
Gage County, Nebraska, and from there they ''went 
west". Defendant returned to Kansas within a short 
time with the team and wagon, wearing some of de-
ceased's clothes. He said he had been in Kansas. De-
ceased's body was later found in Gage County, Nebraska, 
with a bullet in the skull cavity. 
To defendant's requested instruction that proof of 
the killing in Gage County had to be shown beyond 
reasonable douht, the trial court added: 
But the place where the remains were found, 
if found at all, may be taken into consideration, 
together with all other evidence, in fixing the 
locality of the homicide, if there was a homicide. 
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In Commonwealth r. Costley (:L\Iass., 1875 ), 118 :Mas~. 
1, defendant shot Julia Ha\Ykes, tied a carriage robe 
around her head, and weighted the body \Yith n 24 lb. 
tailor's goose tied around the neck. The body was de-
posited near a bridge in Fore River, Norfolk Comtty, 
about 2¥2 to 31f2 miles from the next county. One of the 
court's syllabi states: 
The finding of a human body, with marks upon 
it of injuries sufficient to cause death, in a river 
in the heart of a county, in such a situation and 
condition as to show that it must have been 
thrown there by the hand of man and not borne 
there by the force of the stream or current, is 
sufficient to warrant the jury in finding that the 
homicide was committed in that county. 
In People 1.;. Latona, 2 Cal. 2d 714, 43 P. 2d 260, the 
court stated: 
Appellant's final point is that the venue was 
not proved, and it is suggested that the murder 
might as well have been committed in Arizona 
and the body brought to where it was found. The 
coagulated blood on the ground underneath the 
head of deceased dispels the suggestions that the 
deceased was killed at some remote place, and the 
point is therefore without merit. 
·It is submitted that the evidence of venue detailed 
abO\'e is sufficient basis for the jury's finding. The 
proof is stronger than in the cited cases. The argument 
of defendant is a dangerous argument. The contention, 
essentially, comes do·wn to this, that since no c~'e-witness 
saw where defendant killed ~Inrtin, defendant must go 
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free. Plainly, the law should not be so helpless, and 
respondent believes that it is not. Defendant's complaint 
about improper venue is not justified. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMIT-
TING EXHIBITS 2, 8, AND 9. 
In his Point III, defendant complains about the 
admission of Exhibits 2, 8, and 9, which are papers per-
taining to the title of Fred Martin's automobile. The 
papers were found in .Martin's wallet. Defendant's 
argument is that the presumption of ownership arising 
from ~1artin's possession of the papers is over-borne by 
the presumption of innocence which favors defendant. 
Defendant's objection is not well taken. The ownership 
of the automobile was not at issue. What was sought to 
be proved was simply that the man in whose wallet the 
papers were found was named Fred Martin. The papers 
in his wallet are perfectly admissible for that purpose. 
Defendant's citation to 16 C.J. 542, Sec. 1033, deals 
with problems arising in criminal cases where some 
presumption comes into operation which conflicts with 
the presumption of innocence. In view of the fact that 
there is no presumption l1ere respecting ·l\Iartin 's guilt 
or innocence, respondent cannot see how the citation is 
helpful. 
Smith u. Hansotl, 34 U. 171, 96 P. 1087, and State u. 
Jlartin, 49 U. 346, 164 P. 500, are also cited by defendant. 
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Those cases involve the admission of samples of a wit-
ness's handwriting as a standard of comparison with 
other handwriting of disputed authenticity. The easps 
are not in point. 
At all events, these papers are but one minor item 
in a mass of proof as to ~1artin 's identity. Exhibit 1, a 
photograph of the murdered man, was identified by Jesse 
R. Kyle. Defendant himself, as a witness, identified tht> 
same photograph and admitted that he and" Pops" were 
in Ogden together (B. 489). Charles Williams, De\Vitt 
Taylor, and Herman Smith also identified ~1artin hy 
the use of the photograph of the body. Respondent is 
at a loss to see how admission of the evidence complained 
about in this point could have any prejudicial effect upon 
the result of the trial or the outcome of this appeal. 
POINT IV. 
ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE 
WITNESS CLAUDE HOLMES WAS CORRECT IN 
THAT (A) THE RULE EXCLUDING PROOF OF 
ANOTHER OFFENSE IS NOT INVOLVED; (B) 
PROOF OF MOTIVE IS ADMISSIBLE; (C) VIOLA-
TION OF THE EXCLUSION RULE WAS NOT A 
BAR TO HIS TESTIMONY. 
Defendant assigns as error the admission of evi-
dence that he was involved in an altercation arising out 
of a diee game in a Blackfoot hotel. During the fraras 
defendant fired his pistol at Emmet Jones. This proof 
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permitted a showing that a bullet fired from defendant's 
gun killed Fred .Martin. Defendant complains that this 
amounts merely to proof of a collateral offense which is 
not admissible on the trial of this crime. 
rrhere is a rule of law that a prosecutor cannot prove 
one crime merely by showing commission of another 
unconnected crime. 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 682. 
But this rule is not applicable here. There is an excep-
tion to the rule which is as well established as is the 
rule itself. 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 683, reads in 
part: 
rrhe general rule of exclusion does not apply 
where the evidence of another crime tends directly 
or fairly to pro,,e, or thro'v light on, accused's 
guilt of the crime charged, or to connect him with 
it, or to prove some particular element, or ma-
terial fact in such crime; or where the two crimes 
are logically related or connected, so that proof 
of the other tends, or is necessary, to prove the 
one charged, or is necessary to a complete account 
thereof, as where they are so inseparable as to 
constitute but one transaction or crime, or where 
the extraneous crime forms part of a chain of 
circumstantial evidence of guilt of the crime 
charged; or whPre the evidence of other offenses 
tends to illustrate, characterize, or explain the 
act charged, when it is capable of more than one 
construction; or where such evidence bears di-
rectly and materially on the question at issue, or 
explains, or aids in the solution of, the crime 
charged. Evidence which is otherwise competent 
or relevant to establish accused's guilt of the 
crime charged is not rendered inadmissible by 
the fact that it incidentally proves or tends to 
prove him guilty of another and distinct crime. 
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Utah law is in accord with the textual math'r eitt>d. 
State v. Peterson, 83 U. 74, 27 P. 2d 20; State c. Bro·ll'u, 
71 U. 381, 266 P. 716. In State v. lVlares, 113 U. ~2;>, 192 
P. 2d 861, this court stated: 
We need say little about the third proposition 
argued by appellant. rrhis assignmeut of error 
raises the inadmissibility of the evidence showing 
the commission of other crimes by the defendant. 
With the possible exception of the stealing of the 
Packard automobile in Denver, Colorado, all other 
offenses were directly connected with and related 
to the principal crime charged. The disposition 
of the property of deceased, the forging of de-
ceased's name to certain documents, and the 
stealing and selling of the personal property are 
admissible for many reasons. These facts and 
circumstances are relevant to establish a motive 
for the killing, to identify the defendant as the 
perpetrator of the crime, to discredit defendant's 
claim of killing in self-defense, and to show an 
attempt on the part of defendant to conceal the 
crime and to prevent an identification of the de-
ceased. A relevant fact does not become incompe-
tent because it may tend to establish another and 
separate crime. 
Respondent submits that the prior shooting fracas 
is necessarily interwoven with proof of the case at bar. 
The defendant is not entitled to diminish the amount of 
competent testimony against him simply by multiplying 
the number of his crimes. 
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in 
permitting Claude Holmes to testify that ~\lartin offered 
him a loan to meet his payroll. The argument appears 
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to be that actually Martin's bank roll amounted only to 
$25.00 and that it is not fair to defendant to impute to 
him a moti\·c to rob and kill for such a small amount of 
money. 
rrhe proof indicates that the amount was larger. 
\lm·tiu offered his bank roll as being nearly big enough 
to meet a 60-75 man payroll. Charles Williams saw 
l\Iartin with a big bankroll in Ogden. That defendant 
thought it sizable enough to be attractive is evidenced 
by the plans discussed in Ogden to get possession of it. 
At bottom, defendant is here simply arguing conflicting 
evidence. The problem of resolving conflicts of evidence 
has been settled by the jury. The evidence outlined above 
was admissible to show motive. T'he law is clear that 
proof of motive, although not required, is proper. 20 
Am. J nr., Evidence, Sec. 340. State c. Woods, 62 U. 397, 
220 P. 215. 
Defendant's final argument in Point IV is that error 
"·as committed when Claude Holmes was permitted to 
testify despite his violation of the exclusion role. Holmes 
had talked to some witnesses for the defense after 
Holmes himself had testified. 
Holmes' conduct may have amounted to contempt, 
but there ·was obviously no effect upon his testimony, 
since he had already testified. The trial court's ruling 
was sensible and practieal and well within discretion. In 
matters of this kind the trial court haR broad discretion. 
The rules governing such happenings are summarized 
in 53 Am. J ur., Trial, Sec. 33, as follows: 
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There is a sharp diversity of opinion as to 
what shall be done when a witness who has Yio-
lated an order directing his exclusion from the 
courtroom is presented. One view is that in such 
a case it is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court whether the testimony of such witness 
shall be received, but that there may be such an 
abuse of discretion in rejecting evidence as will 
justify interference by an appellate court, and a 
refusal to receive evidence where the party is 
without fault may violate his constitutional right~. 
To justify an interference with the reception of 
such evidence, the case must be an extreme one. 
Where a witness who has been put under the rule 
remains in the courtroom after testifying, it is 
discretionary whether he shall be permitted to 
be recalled. 
Another view is that a witness' violation of 
the order of the court after being placed under 
the rule will not alone disqualify him, and that 
the court has no power to exclude his testimony 
for this reason. These authorities hold that the 
party calling the witness is entitled to his testi-
mony in any event, notwithstanding the violation 
of the rule. 
A third view is that where a witness who has 
been put under the rule violates the order of the 
court without the consent, connivance, or procure-
ment of the party calling him or of the counsel 
representing such party, the witness is not there-
by rendered incompetent to testify, and that the 
party calling him cannot, on account of the Yio-
lation of the order without his fault, be rightfully 
deprived of the testimony of such witness. Under 
this view, if the party is at fault the evidence may 
be excluded. In any event, to render the exclusion 
of evidence prejudicial it must be made to appear 
that the ·witness would have testified to a materia! 
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fact. Of course, under any of the above rules a 
disobedient witness may be punished for contempt 
of court, and his disobedience may be considered 
as affecting his credibility. Where it could not be 
foreseen that a person in the courtroom who did 
not observe an order excluding witnesses, would 
be needed as a witness, it is proper to permit him 
to be called to rebut testimony. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO IN-
srrRUCT ON ALL INCLUDED OFFENSES WAS 
CORRECT. 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in not 
instructing on all included offenses. Defendant appears 
to argue that the whole record is speculative, and that if 
the jury were permitted to speculate about the murder 
charge, it should be permitted to speculate about all 
included offenses. 
Defendant's point simply amounts to an attack on 
the sufficiency of the evidence. The answering argument 
in this connection is taken up in Point VI of this brief. 
Defendant virtually concedes that the evidence \Vould 
not support a manslaughter charge; the proposition 1s 
phrased negatively (page 37 of defendant's brief): 
There is nothing in the evidence to indicate 
that the deceased was not killed in a sudden 
quarrel or heat of passion or that he was not 
killed in self-defense, by whoever killed him. 
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Utah law is clear that "'here the evidew:l' would not 
support a finding of guilt of a lesser included offensl' the 
trial court should not instruct on such included offenses. 
State v. Mcwhinney, 43 U. 135, 134 P. 632; State t'. 
Thompson, 110 U. 113, 170 P. 2d 153. 
POINT VI. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE VERDICT. 
Defendant outlines three factual issues which he 
claims to be determinative, and as to which he claims 
failure of proof. These points will be discussed in the 
same order in which defendant takes them up. 
Defendant argues first that there is no evidence as 
to identification of the body. This proposition is dis-
cussed in Point III of this brief. The proof is not re-
stated here. Defendant's own identification of the vi<'-
tim 's photograph, while on the witness stand, is a com-
plete answer (B. 489). 
Defendant's second contention is that there is no 
proof that the place of the homicide was Cache County, 
Utah. This is substantially a reargument of defendant's 
Point II, and is answered in Point II of this brief. 
Defendant also contends that the evidence does not 
support the finding that he was the murderer. Respon-
dent believes that when the ·whole record is examined 
the court ·will emerge with a settled conviction of de-
fendant's guilt. The proof shows an opportunity to kill, 
a motive, a clear connection of defendant with the crime, 
and flight. _l\Iartin was killed ·with defendant's gun, which 
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defendant had with him only a few hours before the 
crime. Defendant left Ogden with l\1:artin, having de-
clared his intention to take Martin back to Blackfoot. 
Proof that defendant and :Martin left Ogden about 10 :00 
p.m. fits in perfectly with the time of the killing at North 
Logan about midnight, in accordance with the medical 
evidence. After the crime defendant drove to Blackfoot. 
The time of defendant's brief stop at Blackfoot inte-
grates with his abandonment of the Plymouth coupe 
there that morning. The spent cartridge case found in 
the automobile, the blood which is of the same blood 
group as :Martin's, and the tire marks, show the involve-
ment of the automobile in the crime. Defendant's flight 
from Blackfoot meant that he abandoned his job, the 
money owed him for back wages, and the automobile in 
which he owned an interest. The trip to Denver, via 
.:\fontana, was erratic and roundabout. The lame expla-
nations of the blood on his clothing and the bullets in 
his possession were understandably rejected by the jury. 
Defendant's consciousness of his own guilt is unmistak-
ably revealed by his actions. 
That the jury reasonably could find that defendant 
shot Fred Martin is demonstrated above. The remaining 
element of murder, malice aforethought, is implicit in 
the nature of this crime. Defendant shot Martin in the 
head, at sufficiently close range to cause powder burns, 
while the victim was dazed or unconscious from a blow 
on the head severe enough to fracture his skull. That 
such a killing is a homicide with malice aforethought is 
the only conclusion consistent with reason. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent believes that all of defendant's assign-
ments of error have been answered and shown to be 
groundless. The court is urged that defendant was ae-
corded a fair and lawful trial at which he was well de-
fended. The jury had ample basis for its verdict and 
could in truth have been more severe than they were. 
Defendant has no just complaint. The judgment should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
JOHN W. HORSLEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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